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Coordination problems in cryptomarkets:   
Changes in cooperation, competition and valuation. 
 
 
Abstract 
The new drug markets emerging on the dark net (TOR) have reduced earlier drug market risk 
factors such as visibility and violence. This study uses economic sociology and transaction 
cost economics to broaden the present understanding of cryptomarkets. Results focus on three 
coordination problems characterising illegal markets and how they are alleviated in 
cryptomarkets. More information and better visibility increase competition, the feedback 
system enforces cooperation and border control introduces a new cost influencing valuation. 
Cryptomarkets are formally structured and regulated by rules of conduct and centralised 
decisions. We argue that the online context circumvents earlier coordination problems in 
illegal markets, making dark net markets more structurally efficient compared to conventional 
drug markets. 
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Introduction 
The Internet has paved the way for a new drug market, referred to as the “dark net 
drug market” or “cryptomarket”. Buyers can now sit at home and safely order illegal drugs 
via their computers, compare prices and products from different sellers, while also avoiding 
law enforcement agencies. It is also less risky for the sellers of illicit drugs. Although partially 
a stereotype, physical strength and shady looks are not important in the online world. In 
cryptomarkets, the characteristics of a successful seller revolve around customer service, 
knowledge and other conventional parameters associated with marketing. This visibility of 
drug selling is no longer a threat to either buyer or seller, something that fundamentally 
changes the organisation of economic activity in open drug markets.  
The cryptomarket known as “Silk Road 2.0” has been at the forefront of this 
development. In 2014, Silk Road 2.0 was one of the largest markets on the dark net (Broséus 
et al., 2016; Soska and Christin, 2015). After making an appearance on 6 November 2013, the 
site only lasted one year before the FBI closed it down on the exact same date a year later in 
2014. Despite being a separate market, Silk Road 2.0 was based on the original version of Silk 
Road – the first and largest dark net market for illegal drugs (Martin, 2013; 2014; Christin, 
2013; Barratt, 2012; Van Hout and Bingham, 2013a). The original Silk Road emerged in 
February 2011, growing at an amazing speed with a turnover that grew from around 15 
million USD in 2012 to an estimated 89 million USD in October 2013 (Aldridge and Décary-
Hetú, 2014). After two and a half years, the FBI shut down the site after it allegedly caught 
the chief administrator of Silk Road (FBI, 2014). Exploiting their forerunner’s success, Silk 
Road 2.0 adapted the same general design and seemingly many of the same buyers and 
vendors. 
Cryptomarkets are fundamentally different from traditional drug markets and could 
potentially change the entire global drug industry (Martin, 2013). In this study, we take a 
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closer look at the top vendors of Silk Road 2.0. Details from vendor profiles, products sites 
and given feedback are used to describe vendors and their operations, emphasising 
characteristics such as shipping, products, profiles and branding. We analyse the cryptomarket 
using a combination of transaction costs economics (Williamson, 1979; Reuter and Kleiman, 
1986) and economic sociology (Beckert and Wehinger, 2012; Thorelli 1986). Our aim is to 
improve comparative studies of illegal drug markets by applying conventional models of 
economic activity to a dark net context.  
 
Traditional and new drug markets 
Illicit drugs, like any other commodity, may be supplied through various market structures. 
Extending Yar’s (2005) comparison of online and offline crime, cryptomarkets can be 
compared to drug markets. Traditional economic drug market theory has often characterised 
drug markets along two axes of differentiation: the degree of visibility and the level of 
distribution. This classification by visibility focuses on how risk management affects the 
modus operandi of drug distributors (Desroches, 2007; Reuter and Kleiman, 1986). It is 
important for drug markets to achieve the right balance of security and visibility in order to 
succeed in selling without entailing too much legal risk. A common distinction is made 
between open or closed drug markets. Street level retail markets are the typical example of 
open markets. Here, anonymous sellers and buyers meet for a brief moment to exchange 
drugs and money at competitive prices. Access to customers and drugs is more important than 
security. In these open markets, systemic and retaliatory violence is used to sanction 
malfeasance and prevent opportunism (e.g. Topalli et al., 2002; Jacobs et al., 2000). At the 
closed end, we find social networks in which peers exchange drugs more concealed from law 
enforcement agencies. Networks require social relationships but are effective at creating trust 
and avoiding violence (May and Hough, 2004; Natarajan and Belanger, 1998).  
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Drug markets are often conceptualised as social networks, or informal 
organisations with no clear hierarchy that excel at building trust between participants (Moeller 
and Sandberg, 2015). Typical characteristics of networks are fragmentation, absence of 
monopoly, entrepreneurship and non-hierarchical organisational structures (e.g. Dorn et al, 
1992; Wright et al., 1993; Murji, 1998; Paoli, 2002; Coomber and Turnbull, 2007). Social 
networks are preferred for drug distribution because it is better to have repeated dealings with 
a trusted supplier than have to find a new one every time (Jarillo, 1988). This interpersonal 
trust reduces opportunism, but introduces a competition problem due to the narrow range of 
participants. Where markets are influenced by the invisible hand of the price mechanism, 
networks are surrounded by an invisible wall that keeps desired participants in and 
undesirable participants out (Thompson, 2003). There are also other organisational structures 
in between markets and networks, such as freelancers and corporations (Natarjan and 
Belanger, 1998; Natarjan et al., 2015) or semi-open markets in pubs (May and Hough, 2004). 
In this study, we will examine how these basic understandings fit into the cryptomarket, a 
market that is structurally very different from conventional drug markets. 
 
Characteristics of economic activity on cryptomarkets 
Cryptomarkets alleviate some of the problems associated with marketing, violence and risk of 
legal sanctions. Encrypted communication offers anonymity in a way that has resulted in 
professionally-run businesses that are based on information sharing. Vendors are dedicated to 
quality service, which often includes professional communication, visibility on forum pages, 
competitive pricing, quality products and avoiding disputes, for example (Van Hout and 
Bingham, 2014; Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2014). In this way, cryptomarkets sustain a level 
of openness that is impossible to achieve in traditional drug markets. Also, trust is not 
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enforced by threats of retaliation, another reason why customers prefer cryptomarkets 
(Martin, 2013; Van Hout and Bingham, 2013a; 2013b; 2014).  
There are aspects of cryptomarkets that make them both a closed and an open 
market at the same time. On a more general level, cryptomarkets are also open in the sense 
that everyone has access to them (in principle), but they are only open for those who are “in 
the know” and who have sufficient technological knowledge. This makes them more similar 
to semi-open markets such as pub or club markets (May and Hough, 2004). However, as 
opposed to the pub or club, the website acts like an intermediary where buyers and vendors 
trade money for drugs (Christin, 2013). This enables a wide selection of buyers and sellers to 
assess each other before making a decision, similar to a market in which prices determine 
purchases. Data from the original Silk Road shows a large number of transactions involving 
illegal drugs, estimating a continuously increasing turnover of around 1.2 million USD a 
month (Christin, 2013; Van Buskirk et al., 2013). Other aspects of cryptomarkets are similar 
to social networks. The seller reputation is the basis for buyer trust (Hardy and Norgaard, 
2015), while buyers earn their trust through repeated dealings. This corresponds to the 
iterative exchanges that characterise networks, except that on cryptomarkets the reputation 
system formalises the trustworthiness of participants for all to see.  
Tzanetakis and colleagues (2015) note that the combination of openness and 
secrecy on cryptomarkets makes online trust fundamentally different from the interpersonal 
trust that characterises traditional illegal drug distribution. Illustratively, some researchers 
refer to cryptomarkets as “marketplaces” on the TOR “network” (Barratt et al., 2013; 
Christin, 2013; Van Hout and Bingham, 2013b; Dolliver 2015), while others note the 
interpersonal trust similar as in network structures (Tzanetakis et al., 2015; Norgaard, 
unpublished). Regardless of categorisations, semi-open or social network, cryptomarkets do 
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seem to have achieved a balance of low risk and high level of traffic that appeals to both 
sellers and buyers (e.g. Van Hout and Bingham, 2013b; 2014).  
 
Transaction cost economics and economic sociology 
The market structure is important and general theories on the organisation of economic 
activities can inform studies of drug markets (Bushway and Reuter, 2008; Dick, 1995). 
Structure is especially important where the costs of running the economic system are high 
(Williamson, 1979). Illegality makes drug distribution very inefficient when concerning 
organisation of production and sales. The fear of law enforcement, absence of enforceable 
contracts, lack of information on the quality of the drugs and the trustworthiness of 
transaction partners are constant sources of uncertainty in illicit drug distribution. All 
participants must be compensated financially for the risks that they run (Reuter and Kleiman, 
1986).  
 These costs are different contingent on the structure of distribution. Eck (1995) 
argues that this implies that drug markets can only take two forms: social networks, or 
marketplaces where routine activity is the norm. Street level drug markets face risks from law 
enforcement agencies because of the visibility of the criminal acts and potential violence from 
competing groups (Reuter, 1983). Therefore, many buyers and sellers prefer social networks 
because of the lower legal risks. Networks have lower risks but they still have costs associated 
with the necessary investments in the interpersonal relationship and reputation (Moeller and 
Sandberg, 2015). These investments make transactions “idiosyncratic” because they become 
person-specific, which entails protracted bargaining and therefore inefficient competition due 
to limited transparency (Williamson, 1979). This reduces the overall effectiveness of drug 
distribution. 
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 Economic theory and economic sociology deal with three main organisational 
structures of economic activity: markets, networks and hierarchies (Thompson, 2003; Murji, 
2007). Real-life organisational forms are flexible and contain elements of multiple forms, but 
these three ideal types represent a continuum, with markets and hierarchies at opposite ends 
and networks in the middle. In markets, there are dispersed agents that act on the information 
of the product price and there is no centre that makes decisions. Networks are self-enforcing 
and embedded in interpersonal relationships that provide a mechanism for the transfer of 
information (Williamson, 1981; Thompson, 2003; Thorelli, 1986; Jarillo, 1988). Hierarchies 
are based on an unequal distribution of power, formal contracts and a decision-maker who 
resolves disputes. The essence of the hierarchy, commonly understood as a firm, is 
organisational coordination. This corresponds to the traditional monopoly model of organised 
crime that Schelling (1967) proposed in which a kingpin controls an organisation top-down. 
Reuter (1983) refuted this as incongruent with an empirical reality that bears a greater 
resemblance to “disorganised crime” (see also Murji, 2007; Dorn et al., 1992; Natarajan and 
Belanger, 1998; 2015; Paoli, 2002; Coomber and Turnbull, 2007). In practice, there are 
mainly high-risk marketplaces based on social networks that require access. In this sense, 
drug markets are failed markets.  
Economic sociology has described how the uncertainty encountered in illegal 
markets can be analytically distinguished as three interrelated coordination problems (Beckert 
and Wehinger, 2012): The competition problem concerns the inefficiency that follows from 
limited marketing; the cooperation problem follows from the absence of contractual 
obligations and legal recourse; the valuation of the product is a problem because there is a 
sharp information asymmetry between seller and buyer regarding the quality of the product 
(Beckert and Wehinger, 2012). In transaction cost economics, Williamson (1979) specified 
that frictions in legal exchanges stem from similar types of problems that he conceptualised as 
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bargaining costs, enforcement costs and search costs. The difference between these 
conceptualisations can be explained from their respective overarching themes. In economic 
sociology the general theme is coordination (Beckert and Wehinger, 2012), while the 
economic perspective revolves around information, or rather the lack thereof (Dick, 1995). 
Clearly, effective coordination hinges on the flow of reliable information, so these 
conceptualisations are easily reconciled. The difference is that economic sociology prioritises 
the social component more (Beckert and Wehinger, 2012) than transaction costs economics 
(Dick, 1995; Reuter, 1983; Williamson, 1979).   
 We use a combination of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1979; Reuter 
and Kleiman, 1986) and economic sociology (Beckert and Wehinger, 2012) to analyse how 
these emerging cryptomarkets solve the inherent coordination problems that characterise 
illicit drug distribution. Our aim is to gain a better understanding of dark net markets and how 
they differ from traditional markets by linking the growing cryptomarket research to broader 
research into the organisation of illegal drug distribution and economic activities.  
 
Method 
The main data in this study comprises the top twenty vendor profiles from Silk Road 2.0 and 
their related product sites and customer feedback. More precisely, 562 screenshots of with 
textual data and images made on 15 September 2014. At that time, the second version of the 
Silk Road market had existed for almost a year since its initialisation on 6 November 2013. 
The bestselling list was arranged by the website and represented vendors with most sold 
products. The list differed greatly from one day to another, so the vendors that have been 
analysed are a randomly selected sample taken at the time. The top twenty vendor profiles had 
some of the most descriptive profiles, which provided an insight into who the main vendors 
on Silk Road 2.0 were and how they interacted with other market participants. Additional data 
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from other markets and forums were collected simultaneously for a larger netnographic 
(Kozinets, 2010) study to analyse the general market structure of cryptomarkets (Bakken, 
2015). These netnographic observations informed the researchers in this study, but is not used 
as the main data for the following analysis.   
 Basic details of the sample were collected from the information box submitted 
as the key information on the vendors. This information included a vendor score based on 
comments and feedback, the length of vending, last seen, number of listings, and to where and 
from they were sending the shipment. All of the vendors had been active for a long time and 
twelve of them had been present from the beginning of Silk Road 2.0 (eleven months). Seven 
of the other vendors had been on Silk Road 2.0 for ten months while one had been present for 
eight months. They were active sellers in this cryptomarket, and while eighteen of the vendors 
had been on Silk Road the same day as the screenshot was taken, the remaining two had been 
present the day before or two days previously. Many of the vendors also kept an “update” part 
in their profile, where they left the latest news, requiring frequent visits. 
 The 20 vendors had a relatively high vendor score, indicating they were 
successful sellers. The vendor score is the average result of all product scores. Out of a 
hundred points, the lowest score was 85 and the highest score 97, and the average was 91.9. 
They also had a high number of listings, meaning the amount of product sites for which the 
vendor was in charge. The vendor listings ranged from 5 to 137, with the average listing 
below 50, where they offered a variety of drugs (see Table 1). 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 Moreover, 65% of the vendors were selling from English-speaking countries: six from the 
United Kingdom, five from the United States, one from Australia and one from Canada. The 
last seven vendors listed EU countries as their origin: three from Germany, two from the 
Netherlands, and two stating only “EU country” on their product sites. All product sites 
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contained specific information about shipping, including product price, shipping destination 
and expected time of arrival. Fourteen of the vendors shipped worldwide. Four only sold 
domestically in the US and Canada and one domestically in Australia, while the last vendor 
wrote “undeclared”.  
 We analysed vendor profiles and their connected feedback and product sites 
qualitatively as case studies (Bryman, 2012). Silk Road 2.0 required specific information in 
assigned information boxes something that resulted in that information such as shipping 
information and products was present in all twenty profiles. While these spots demanded only 
a minimum of information, the profiles and product sites were often used by vendors to 
provide more detailed information about shipping, geographical location and price. This was 
compared across the sample to see how it differed among the vendors. The more general 
information was then supplemented with information written by the vendors themselves in the 
profile text or product sites., The vendor profiles included descriptive information about who 
they were as vendors, how their business was organised, and what they had as their ethos or 
strategy for sales. Both profiles and product sites were analysed by examining vendor 
presentation, production updates, expressed vendor movement to other sites, product 
presentation and shipping details. We have focused on information about the product, the 
vendor, and organisation, including presentation form and information.   
 In this article, we use selected data from Silk Road 2.0 to explore a larger 
structural theory about illegal markets – and look at differences between cryptomarkets and 
legal businesses and economies. The main limitation of our approach is the focus on the top 
twenty vendors.This leads to an uneven balance of successful vendors, maybe exaggerating 
the functionality of these markets. Comprising less successful vendors might have provided a 
different picture. While acknowledging this limitation, we note that the successful vendors 
were very active, had many sales and invested much in the running of the market. Another 
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limitation is that the comparison to traditional illegal drug markets is based on available 
literature and theory. This makes our argument about the relative effectiveness of online and 
offline drug markets a suggestive one that needs further investigation. We still believe this 
study points to important structural differences in drug markets that can, and should, be 
explored theoretically. 
 
Results 
In cryptomarkets the coordination problems of traditional drug markets – competition, 
cooperation, and valuation – (Beckert and Wehinger, 2012) are resolved in new ways. 
Competition is more intense, involving a multitude of exchanges and comparable prices. 
Cooperation is improved through a formalised trust-building system instead of violence or 
interpersonal trust. The most important indirect costs influencing the valuation problem is a 
change from law enforcement to border control. Below we go into details on each of these 
coordination problems, describing vendor profiles, feedback system, products and risks in 
cryptomarkets. 
 
Competition 
The absence of competitive structures is one of the main coordination problems in illegal 
markets (Beckert and Wehinger, 2012). Conventional drug markets are structurally inefficient 
because there is an absence of state-sanctioned rules protecting participants from price 
cooperation, limits on offering products openly and a lack of information when comparing 
levels of service, prices or product quality. The fragmented structure and trading in personal 
networks makes competition in illegal drug markets inefficient (Arlacchi, 1998). Williamson 
(1979) refers to this as the bargaining costs that are a consequence of idiosyncratic 
transactional relationships. Cryptomarkets seem to change competition dramatically and be 
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more efficient. The encrypted dark net makes it possible to advertise products openly and 
establish websites for sale, thus formalising structures that increase competition.  
 
A visible drug market 
An important element of cryptomarkets is profiles offering a presentation of the vendors, their 
products, and services. As mentioned in the method section, Silk Road 2.0 offered an 
information box providing basic information on all vendors. It included vendor score, length 
of vending experience, last seen, and from/to where the vendor ships. Most vendors then used 
their profiles to clarify their own rules regarding how to order goods, shipping time, refunds, 
delivery information, etc. Eighteen of the vendors started their profile with a news update, 
providing information of particular importance. This could be news about the latest batch on 
sale, problems with the site or shipping, and new shipping rules or banned countries: 
 
26.06.2014: New reship/refund policy for customers from Australia. (…) This 
is due to many “fresh” Australian orders being recently reported as lost. 
Surprisingly, orders arrive just fine for the old customers, even when sent on 
the same day (…). Sorry guys, (…) but we have to protect ourselves from 
scammers somehow, since we already lowered our profit margin to provide 
affordable prices for our wares. 
 
Being able to provide this information reduced the inventory problem experienced by drug 
distributors in conventional markets (Moeller and Sandberg, 2015; Aldridge and Askew, 
2017). It was crucial for business to be considered trustworthy and provide accurate 
information (Van Hout and Bingham, 2014). Vendors had to create an image of themselves as 
responsible vendors selling a quality product with a satisfactory level of customer service.  
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All of the top profile texts were written in a service-minded mode: polite, formal, and 
informative: 
 
9/13/2014 - All items in stock. Some orders received between 9/2 and 9/8 
shipped on 9/13 because of the back to school rush. Huge apologies to 
anyone who has been delayed and thank you for being patient! 
 
The profile was not only important in presenting their business; it was also a way to protect 
themselves from negative feedback, low scores and bad reputations. Despite the generally 
polite tone, eight vendors also displayed a rough tone in parts of their profile, telling their 
customers to contact them personallyt in private messages if they experienced problems. 
Thirteen vendors also instructed buyers to read carefully the profile before placing an order. 
This was to limit the number of questions or misunderstandings, and related negative 
feedback. 
    
Increased competition 
The numerous suppliers in cryptomarkets increase competition (Van Hout and Bingham, 
2013a). Silk Road 2.0 had around 450–550 vendors actively selling illegal goods 
(Munksgaard et al., 2016). The top vendors offered a great variety of merchandise but had to 
compete for buyers’ attention. One way of standing out was to highlight particular aspects of 
the business. A popular method was to show closeness to the product by describing a private 
production process. One of the vendors specialised in liquid mushrooms and provided this 
detailed description of how to produce a potent drug: 
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These are regular hallucinogenic mushrooms (Cambodian and Golden 
Teacher races) that I’ve grown myself, dried, pulverized, then used an 
ethanol alcohol extraction method with a specialized funnel over multiple 
washes, and finally controlled evaporation down to desired potency. It’s a 
time-consuming process, and takes about a month to do it right. 
 
The same vendor also stated being a user and gave advice on dosage and warnings of what 
could go wrong. Another vendor stood out by selling homemade THC-infused sweets. This 
was also the only vendor out of twenty vendors who had a nickname that indicated the vendor 
was a female, possibly indicating that emphasizing being a woman was a way to stand out in 
the crowd. Other vendors used large figure decorations made out of symbols, or images of 
drug tests to draw attention to themselves. 
 Making communication in the profile personal was a widely used strategy 
among vendors. Half of the vendors presented themselves as single people, referring to 
themselves as “I” throughout the profile. Three of these switched between “I” and “we”, 
where one mentioned he had a team with him. The remaining half only referred to themselves 
in the plural. This might point to a variation among the vendors on Silk Road 2.0, in which 
some of them ran their own business, while others worked in teams. It could also be a result 
of division of work, where one person could be responsible for communication and 
administrative work on the cryptomarket, while others produced, packaged and shipped the 
drugs. Eight of the vendors emphasised the high volume of inquiries. According to the 
profiles, one way to make the organisation more effective was to divide the operation into 
different work tasks. 
 The Silk Road vendors worked hard to establish their user name as a product 
brand. They invested a lot of effort in protecting their user name from negative feedback and 
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from being misused by others, such as this vendor defending himself from hurtful feedback: 
“Remember we are the good guys. Don’t go away feeling done over or wronged without 
having a chat with us. We will do our best to make it right”. A way of protecting themselves 
was to prefer returning customers, which also helped reduce the effect of competition. Not 
only was their user name used frequently throughout their profile and product sites, they also 
tried to claim a monopoly on the same names in the forum and on other dark net markets. If 
someone “stole” their name and presented products under the same or similar name, vendors 
were quick to defend their brand in their own profiles.Such as this vendor clarifying his/her 
existence on different markets: “We are only active on Silkroad 2.0 and do not vend on any 
other markets at this moment. We are no longer active on Agora (…). We have never been a 
vendor on Evolution or Drug Market.”. 
Through vendor profiles, private messages and discussion threads, drug 
consumers and manufacturers can now communicate directly (Martin, 2013; Christin, 2013; 
Barratt, 2012). Seven of the twenty vendors stated to produce their own products. A possible 
direct contact with manufacturers means that consumers can receive purer drugs and more 
information about the drugs they are using, potentially reducing the harm of drug use (Barratt 
et al., 2013; Van Hout and Bingham, 2013a). Silk Road is not only a “business-to-customer” 
market, it is also a “business-to-business” market, indicated by the large quantities that are 
sometimes sold (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2014:16-17). This willingness to sell larger 
amounts demonstrates that the cryptomarket structure has proven to be effective at securing 
transactions, reducing opportunism, while maintaining competition between vendors. The 
welinforming vendor profiles on Silk Road provide a platform for offering products openly, 
as well as offer detailed information when customers compare levels of service, prices and 
product quality. This indicates that cryptomarkets make price cooperation more difficult, 
possible offering a more competitive structure than other illegal drug markets.  
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Cooperation 
The second coordination problem in illegal markets is cooperation, or the absence of 
contractual obligations and legal recourse (Beckert and Wehinger, 2012). In legal markets, the 
state and its institutions seek to create trust between economic actors because this will 
improve efficiency and growth. Not only do illegal markets operate independently of a 
centralised-authority state, they also operate against the state - and this generates much 
uncertainty compared to legal transactions (Becker and Wehinger, 2012). In illegal markets, 
cooperation is based on networks, interpersonal trust, threats of violence and reputational 
concerns, which all require investments of various kinds (Moeller and Sandberg, 2016). 
Williamson (1979) describes this as enforcement costs, which are the expenses associated 
with securing the transaction. This can be understood as a question of asymmetric 
information, because only the seller knows if he is trustworthy and will deliver the product 
agreed upon. Compensating for the risk of cooperation problems leads to market inefficiency 
and a price increase (Reuter and Kleiman, 1986). With centrally regulated, formalised and 
effective forms of promoting trust and reducing uncertainty for all participants, the 
cooperation problem is reduced (Beckert and Wehinger, 2012). 
 
Formalising reputation 
The feedback system was an essential function of Silk Road 2.0 when customers confirmed 
they had received the drugs. It was a formal system introduced by the site administrators to 
avoid scammers among both vendors and buyers. The vendors were ranked according to stars 
(1–5) and a short comment, such as: “Great stealth and the product was good. Just would 
have liked a faster shipping.” On cryptomarkets, drug listings are public and communication 
is encrypted and anonymised. Using reputation scores has made it possible to formalise and 
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spread reputations publicly (Tzanetakis et al., 2015). By introducing market rules like the 
feedback system and actively using sanctions such as excluding vendors, the administrator 
actively regulates market behaviour.  
The feedback system is crucial in ensuring a basis for cooperation. For example, 
when sellers did not live up to the standards of their advertisements or buyer expectations it 
was easy to file a complaint for all to see: “Your gear is shit and you sent me crap! I demand 
a 250% refund or I’ll tell the forums!” By reading feedback, other buyers could easily 
distinguish between vendors they wanted to do business with and those that would be best 
avoided (see also Décary-Hétu, Paquet-Clouston and Aldridge, 2016). Feedback was usually 
directed towards vendor, product, shipping, or communication between the buyer and the 
vendor. Most buyers had tried the products before leaving feedback, or used different tests to 
check the quality. Many wrote “perfect as usual” or “never had any problems with this 
vendor”, suggesting that they were regular customers.  
The negative feedback about possible scammers was particularly important. The 
reasons for complaints were usually that a package had not arrived – or had not been sent at 
all. The product may also not have lived up to expectations or smelt differently than it should. 
The vendors in this study had high feedback scores and were seldom described as outright 
scammers, but were still sometimes accused of occasionally hustling in comments such as: 
“Did not receive original order or resend. Selective scammer”. A selective scammer was a 
vendor who sent packages and carried out normal sales with most clients but then chose not to 
fulfil certain orders by stating that they had been lost in the post. 
 Feedback is also an important mechanism for securing trust in legal online 
markets and has a great impact on sales (Houser and Wooders, 2006). Without traditional 
trust based on location, inspections and long-standing reputations, online stores have to 
establish trust by providing more information about seller and products, and public feedback 
18 
 
(Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002; Resnick et al., 2006). The feedback system creates a more 
fluent and efficient market and makes rich networks an important factor to succeed (Décary-
Hetú and Dupont, 2013). Both the administrator and vendors encourage buyers to leave 
feedback, in statements such as: “Can everyone who orders please leave feedback! We need it 
to make this community work, currently only about 10% of customers are actually leaving any 
feedback.” Without the buyers’ involvement in these reputation standards, such formalised 
systems of trust in cryptomarkets would not work. Equally, the feedback systems make it 
harder for new vendors to become established and, as in legal markets, they should expect to 
invest a lot of time and effort in establishing a reputation when entering the market (Fan et al, 
2013).  
The feedback system in cryptomarkets is a formalised way of building trust 
(Tzanetakis et al, 2015) that shares many similarities with contractual arrangements found in 
legal markets (Houser and Wooders, 2006). Site administrators sanction vendors who 
repeatedly infringe on the rules and the feedback system motivate vendors to provide high-
quality products and good customer service to optimise outputs and market flow (Van Hout 
and Bingham, 2014). Negative feedback can potentially ruin a business and force vendors to 
be service-minded and communicate in a friendly and open way with buyers. In conventional 
drug markets, drug sellers also gain a reputation for how they conduct their business and 
sellers with a good reputation attract more customers (Moeller and Sandberg, 2016). 
Cryptomarkets can sanction malicious peers at a very low cost because they only lose their 
business, as opposed to also risking violent retaliation or snitching, as in the traditional drug 
markets. In the cryptomarket under study, the drug seller reputation is formalised through the 
feedback system in a way that ensures trust and makes cooperation easier. This hierarchical 
characteristic suggests that they are more structurally effective than traditional drug markets.   
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Valuation 
The third coordination problem in illegal markets concerns the process of classification and 
comparisons, influencing product valuation (Beckert and Wehinger, 2012). Akerlof’s (1970) 
classic lemon problem is particularly relevant to illegal drugs and highlights how uncertainty 
about product quality influences valuation. Lack of market visibility makes it difficult to 
assign value to certain categories of goods and to see the different value of heterogeneous 
products within the same market. The valuation problem can also be understood in terms of 
search costs (Williamson, 1979). Many transactions in illegal markets take place because the 
customer is desperate for the product and lacks alternative dealers. The network structure that 
typically characterises illegal drug distribution is a response to these problems. The 
transparency of cryptomarkets (Tzanetakis et al., 2015) attenuates the coordination problem 
associated with valuation. It also introduces new uncertainties, because sometimes shipments 
do not arrive as agreed.   
 
Product presentation and shipping 
Online anonymity in cryptomarkets has made it possible for vendors of illegal drugs to 
present their products openly, making product valuation easier for customers. Information and 
the use of commercial tricks such as jargon, appealing pictures and weekly deals or discounts 
is common. This is one example of how vendors advertised their products: 
 
Listing is for 1 gram of [vendor name] 95–99% MDMA. The connoisseur’s 
first choice, the best quality, the strongest potency, the ultimate seduction. 
(…) Flawless delivery rate – Buy with confidence! 
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When entering the profiles, the headline and product picture is the first thing that catches the 
customers’ attention. Most headlines include type of drug, quantity, brand name and a 
descriptive factor such as “pure”, “raw” or “amazing”. All vendors had product pictures, 
often including a sign featuring their vendor name, or common objects such as coins to prove 
the product size.  
 The business strategies of the vendors in this study differed. Most sold multiple 
drugs, the average was 2–4 items, but a few listed up to eight different types of drugs (see 
table 1). Pure MDMA and cocaine were the most sold drugs; both were sold by half of the 
vendors. Seven vendors sold one drug exclusively. This might have been the only drug they 
had access to although some described this as a desire to specialise in certain drugs in order to 
offer a particular kind of expertise. Others expressed an empathy with their specific product, 
such as this vendor selling homegrown cannabis: 
 
I’m a small farmer who grows his herb with care and has the medical user 
in mind. So clean, healthy and potent cannabis. Supplied also to local 
clinics. This is a passion of mine and I enjoy providing this wonderful plant 
to others to enjoy and utilize in whatever way they choose whether 
recreationally or medically. 
 
 All vendors offered different quantities, either in grams or numbers of pills, showing that Silk 
Road 2.0 was used for different purposes such as personal use, social dealing and resale. The 
usual amount of cocaine, marihuana, MDMA crystals etc., was 1-gram packages, while 
multiple vendors also sold 5g and 10g on their top 5 list. Vendors selling pills or capsules 
usually sold one or two, but also sold up to 25 or 50 pieces. The biggest shipment offered was 
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100g of amphetamine paste, which indicates there were buyers aiming for reselling the 
products they bought. Larger amounts made the price lower per gram or number of pills, 
while drug strength and destination additionally affected the price. Buyers could therefore 
choose to spend more money for quality, or less for quantity. As Table 2 shows, the prices of 
1g MDMA varied from 22€ to 211€, where a domestic Australian vendor had the highest 
price. When selling larger quantities, about 0.5-1g was given freely when buying 5g, and even 
more at 10g.  
<INSERT TABLE 2> 
 The product sites included a detailed description of shipping, split into 
destinations and prices. The shipping categories were usually “Europe/EU countries”, 
“USA/Canada”, “Australia” and “Other parts of the world”. Six only distinguished between 
international and domestic shipments. The expected time of arrival depended on the country 
of origin. A shipment to Australia and New Zealand took the longest while Scandinavia 
expanded the shipment duration compared to mainland Europe. European vendors often 
guaranteed a next day delivery by domestic post, combined with a detailed shipping schedule 
and fixed deadlines for incoming orders, like this UK vendor: 
 
UK CUSTOMERS – all items will be sent by Royal Mail First class. Items 
ordered before 1pm will be sent out on the same day, order made after will 
be sent out the following working day. 60% of the time it will arrive the next 
working day, but if not then usually the working day after. 
 
In USA/Canada, the expected delivery time for a domestic shipment was longer and most 
vendors expected it to be around 3–4 days. Some vendors operated with very long time 
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frames. One vendor stated that it took about 40 days to send to Ukraine, another that packages 
to Australia, New Zealand and Russia might take up to eight weeks. 
 
The new risks of cryptomarkets 
The FBI and other law enforcement agencies have closed down a few cryptomarkets but it is 
the daily risk of hacker attacks and scams that represent the bigger threat (Van Hout and 
Bingham, 2013a). Some cryptomarkets have experienced large scams such as the 
administrator running off with the money held in Escrow (Woolf, 2015; Greenberg, 2013), 
while others have had external hacker attacks (Hajdarbegovic, 2014). In the vendor profiles 
and product presentations we studied, sellers were concerned about national customs. Risk-
reducing strategies differed significantly when drugs were distributed domestically and 
internationally. One vendor, for example, changed MDMA from crystal form to powder when 
shipping internationally. Another reduced the risk by varying the countries they shipped from: 
 
Any order to a country outside the Netherlands is now shipped from 
Germany for your safety. (…) For security reasons we cannot tell you what 
days we ship, but we change it every week. 
 
The price of shipment varied depending on where it was being sent. It cost more to ship 
internationally but risk assessment was also important (see also Décary-Hétu, Paquet-
Clouston and Aldridge, 2016). Shipping across borders heightened the risk of the package 
being seized and the recipient being visited by the police. Longer distances also demanded 
more extensive securing of the packages and many vendors alternated their stealth (method of 
securing shipment) when shipping overseas. One vendor explained:  
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The high price of postage for international orders reflects the time, effort 
and skill, which goes into preparing an international letter. (…) I must 
stress that international shipping times have always been random (...). 
 
Vendors did not just raise prices depending on these risks but also narrowed down rights of 
reshipments or refunds in cases where customers did not receive the drugs. A basic refund or 
reshipment amounted to between 30–100% of the ordered products, but the rights usually 
required a customer to be a returning customer. Some vendors demanded a total of 8–10 
purchases or a minimum spend of 500–600 USD to refund drugs that had been lost in transit.  
The risks of scams or rigorous border controls led vendors to restrict their 
shipping destinations. Nine vendors mentioned high-risk countries where buyers were 
forfeited their right to ask for their money back or receive a new shipment. Australia and New 
Zealand were among the top countries not worth the risk because of their tight border 
controls. One vendor stated: “We lose about 1 in 20 packages to Australia. This is a 
considerably higher rate of loss than other areas”. The Nordic countries were also considered 
risky destinations and some vendors would not ship to European countries such as Italy, the 
Netherlands and the Czech Republic. Moreover, the risk of scammers led many vendors to 
ban countries like Russia and continents/areas such as South America, Africa and the Middle 
East. Examples of scams could be buyers wrongfully claiming not to have received the goods 
or complaining about the quality or amount of drugs received, and asking for compensation.  
 Data from top twenty vendor profiles on Silk Road indicates that cryptomarkets 
offer many new opportunities that stem from the structural organisation of their transactions, 
most importantly, making the processes of classifying and comparing products and suppliers 
more effective than in traditional drug markets. This can reduce the valuation problem in 
illegal markets as described by Beckert and Wehinger (2012). As opposed to most traditional 
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illegal drug markets, buyers can choose from a variety of sellers and receive detailed 
information about products, prices and quality (Bancroft and Reid, 2015). The large variety of 
drugs offered (Christin, 2013) also provides an opportunity to explore and assign different 
values to certain categories of goods. The time it takes to order a drug also makes drugs 
bought in “desperation” less common and customers will typically make a more balanced 
decision regarding drug purchases than in, for example, an open street drug market. This 
opens up for more effective solutions to the problem of valuation than what is typically the 
case in illegal drug markets. 
 
Discussion 
The anonymity of cryptomarkets enables direct contact between a multitude of sellers and 
buyers of illegal goods. Vendors can advertise their products in personal profiles and buyers 
can provide public feedback and participate in discussion forums. The technological 
innovation of the dark net has enabled a reduction in the problems of visibility and security 
that plague regular drug markets. Creating a market with less traditional drug trading 
problems might lead to a change in the vendor and buyer population, as well as an increase of 
international drug trade. This innovation has also changed the organisation of illegal drug 
markets dramatically, enabling more formalised structures with rules and centralised 
regulation.  
 Tzanetakis and colleagues (2015) describe the transparency paradox of 
conventional and online drug markets and reveal how they differ in terms of formalised trust 
building, conflict resolution and logistics. These three elements are similar to the coordination 
problems identified by Beckert and Wehinger (2013). For example, conflict resolution can be 
seen as an aspect of a broader issue of competition. Traditional illegal markets must restrict 
access to information but cryptomarkets introduce a system of third-party-conflict resolution 
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that ensures sellers compete for customers on price and service (Tzanetakis et al., 2015). This 
also reduces bargaining costs (Williamson, 1979) by removing the incentive for either party to 
act opportunistically. A central authority with sanctioning capacity oversees the transaction. 
This market structure promotes reliable quality information and fair competition, arguably 
making cryptomarkets more effective than traditional drug markets.  
Building trust is a transaction cost in any kind of economic transfer and it is the 
essential part of the cooperation problem in illegal drug markets (Beckert and Wehinger, 
2012). How this trust and cooperation is established is different for the various forms of 
economic organisation. Administrators and participants are proactively promoting trust 
through the market structure in cryptomarkets, because the centralised review system 
encourages good conduct (Décary-Hetú and Dupont. 2013). The feedback system is an 
important base for a more formalised way of building trust (Tzantakis et al., 2015), which 
reduces the enforcement costs as compared to markets (Williamson, 1979) and networks 
(Moeller and Sandberg, 2015).   
Finally, the question of valuation (Beckert and Wehinger, 2012) is also a 
problem of logistics in cryptomarkets (Tzanetakis et al., 2015) or interpreted as additional 
costs (Williamson, 1979). Trafficking drugs across borders is the riskiest aspect of the 
distribution process and therefore the biggest cost component in the price of illicit drugs. In 
cryptomarkets, national customs and the cost of circumventing them have become the most 
important indirect costs that add price to the product. Cryptomarkets still remain illegal 
markets with important risks that increase the cost of the product (Caulkins and Reuter, 1998). 
The transparency of information on price differences between shipping points and 
destinations reduces the valuation problem, but the essential uncertainty persists. We note, 
however, that this is primarily a problem for international shipping and specific high-risk 
destinations. 
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In traditional drug markets, hierarchies are unfeasible in the longer run because 
they are visible and draw attention from law enforcement agencies (Reuter, 1983). 
Cryptomarkets circumvent the problem of visibility by using encrypted communication and 
anonymous payments. The cryptomarket structure improves information flows, attenuates 
opportunism and creates trust between participants at comparably costs (Aldridge and Askew, 
2017). While cryptomarket participants sometimes scam each other, they also act together in a 
concerted way. Transaction costs seem to be embedded in a deeply rooted demand for justice 
(Ouchi, 1980), where most participants attempt to make the market efficient and well-
functioning. Furthermore, administrators of dark net sites can monitor the progress of 
exchanges and evaluate vendors and buyers according to review scores – and punish 
infractions by banning users. Cryptomarkets therefore share some characteristics with a 
hierarchical structure based on an unequal distribution of power where a decision-maker 
resolves disputes and introduces formal contracts.  
 
Conclusion 
This study of top vendor profiles in Silk Road 2.0 and their connected feedback and product 
sites suggests that online and dark net context has made it possible to run a drug market as a 
more formalised and centrally-regulated structure than conventional drug markets. Until they 
are legalized, drug markets can never become fully formalised, but in cryptomarkets, drug 
sellers can create a more effective system of drug distribution. We have analysed illegal drug 
market transactions from the same perspective as financially legal transactions. Our argument 
is that cryptomarkets are formally organised, meaning hierarchically run with rules and 
limitations. This makes them better at reducing the coordination problems found in traditional 
drug markets. Cryptomarkets reduce costs because the investments in trust that characterise 
distribution in social networks can be transferred to other suppliers through the review 
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system. The importance of feedback (positive) and the centrally-regulated review system 
greatly reduces the uncertainty usually associated with illicit transactions. Visibility is no 
longer a major security threat and sellers and buyers can communicate directly through 
messaging systems, discussion forums, vendor profiles and feedback systems. Cryptomarkets 
thus represent a fundamentally new type of drug market. 
Data in this study are from a sample of successful vendors in one particular 
market, and findings cannot be generalised to vendors and cryptomarkets in general. We still 
believe that insights generated from our study can contribute to a better theoretical 
understanding of cryptomarkets. To comprehend and conceptualise these new markets, 
netnographic studies and insights from transaction cost economics and economic sociology 
are crucial. Combined, they suggest how the problems of competition, cooperation and 
valuation in traditional drug markets are solved better in cryptomarkets. The cryptomarket 
structure provides advantages for both vendors and buyers, increasing potential sales and safer 
buys. If this holds true, we should expect a further rise of dark net drug markets in the future.  
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TABLE 1 – An overview of vendors, product sites and the main products offered 
Vendor Listings1 Products 
1 25 MDMA, cocaine 
                                                 
1 “Listings” represents the number of product sites of each vendor. These might represent different drugs, but 
also the same drugs but vary in amount. The numbers were usually higher than the actual visible amount 
because inactive product sites were also counted for.  
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2 10 Cocaine, amphetamine, MDMA 
3 30 Cocaine, MDMA, amphetamine, ecstasy 
4 52 MDMA, cocaine, mephedrone, 2ci, LSD 
5 18 Ketamine, MDMA, mephedrone, ketamine 
6 3 Liquid mushrooms 
7 51 MDMA, amphetamine, cocaine, ecstasy, cannabis, LSD 
8 
108 
Ecstasy, MDMA, mephedrone, cocaine, hashish, DOM/STP, DOB, 
Viagra 
9 23 THC infused suckers (cannabis) 
10 15 Cocaine, MDMA 
11 137 Marihuana, hashish 
12 6 Heroin 
13 25 Ketamine, MDMA 
14 9 Cocaine 
15 13 Cocaine, hashish 
16 13 LSD 
17 6 Marihuana 
18 
27 
Mescaline HCL, DOM/STP, LSD 
19 28 Amphetamine, MDMA, cocaine 
20 5 LSD 
 
 
TABLE 2 – Examples of prices offered on Silk Road 2.0 from vendors in the sample 
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From To Consistency Strength Price for 
1 gram 
Price for 
5/10/25 gram  
US US Crystals 95-99% 53,2 € 5g: 221,7 € 
Germany Worldwide Powder 80% 22,2 € 5g: 95,9 € 
Germany Worldwide Crystals 80% --- 5g: 78,4 € 
UK Worldwide Crystals and 
powder 
--- 28,4 € 5g: 129,2 € 
UK Worldwide --- --- 29,4 € 10g: 225,6 € 
Netherlands Worldwide Crystals 84% 22,9 € 10g: 138,7 € 
UK Worldwide --- --- 26,2 € --- 
Germany Worldwide --- --- 48,3 € 10g: 165,1 € 
UK Worldwide --- --- --- 25g: 614,9 € 
Australia Australia Crystals --- 211,3 € --- 
 
